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Introduction 
This paper will address the metaethical theory presented by Richard 
Brandt in his influential work, A Theory of the Good and the Right.1 The 
book analyzes desires and aversions, which Brandt calls "valences," and 
presents a method whereby such valences may be labeled rational or 
irrational. Brandt then proposes that this notion of rational and irrational 
valences may be substituted in ethics for talk of the good and the right.2 
This paper will present an overview of the general features of Brandt's 
work, and then offer criticisms that show that Brandt's account of rational 
and irrational desires is in its present state unworkable. The paper will close 
with some speculations concerning the appropriateness of the terms 
"rational" and "irrational" in reference to valences at all. 
I. An Overview of Brandt's Program 
Rationality concerns confrontation with and proper response (actual or 
potential) to relevant facts and logic. So, Brandt proposes, if desires and 
aversions can be influenced, altered, extinguished, or created by the agent's 
exposure to relevant facts and logic, then they can be labeled with terms of 
rationality. "In the case of desires ... there can be 'criticism' only in the sense 
that the desire ... is shown to be what it would (or would not) be if it were 
maximally influenced by evidence and logic."3 
That such influence is indeed possible Brandt justifies by appeal to 
contemporary psychotherapeutic models that make use of exposure to facts 
and logic in the alteration of action. Specifically, Brandt culls from recent 
research the fact that many therapeutic methods incorporate cognitive 
elements-that is, elements that confront the patient with relevant facts and 
logic concerning the fulfillment of a given valence. These cognitive 
elements are viewed as significant and even essential ingredients in the 
alteration of behavior. From this Brandt concludes that these cognitive 
Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979). Hereafter cited in text and notes as TGR. 
2When the word "desire" is used—whether for stylistic purposes, in 
quotations, or because of the carelessness of the author, it is to be 
understood as a synonym for "valence." The question of whether or not 
aversions are simply negative desires will be bracketed for this discussion, 
though it may have important implications for the development of Brandt's 
program. 
3Brandt, TGR, p. 11. 
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4See especially chapters two and four of TGR (pp. 24-45, 70-87). Brandt 
asserts that "What an agent does is always a function of his desires at the 
time; there is no such thing as motives by belief alone. Present desires for 
outcomes (and beliefs about how acts will produce them ) ... motivate 
persons" (p. 83). Here he clearly sets himself against more explicitly rational 
motivation theories like that of Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), see especially pp. 14ff. Nagel 
could respond that Brandt has merely trivialized the notion of desires to 
mean "anything that motivates"—see for example TGR, p. 25: "For 
something to be valenced for a person at a time is for that person to be in a 
certain 'central motive state' ... perhaps ideally describable in complex 
physiological-chemical terminology as 'a readiness of certain neuron sets to 
fire."' 
5Brandt, TGR, p. 113. 
6See Norman Daniels, "Can Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconcile Reason and 
Desire?" Ethics 93 (1983): 776, text and note 9. 
7Brandt, TGR, p. 113. 
8 See Brandt, "The Explanation of Moral Language" and Normal Daniels, 
'Two Approaches to Theory Acceptance in Ethics," both in David Copp and 
elements have valence-alteration power. If the action is changed, it is 
because the motivating valences have changed.4 
Brandt formulates the notion of cognitive psychotherapy (CP) as the 
"process of confronting desires with relevant information, by repeatedly 
representing it, in a ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time ... ." 5 Each 
of these phrases defines a vital aspect of the proper procedure, and they are 
developed and defended over almost one hundred pages of detailed 
investigation of contemporary psychotherapy and psychological research. 
The terminology "cognitive psychotherapy" is unfortunately misleading. 
It must be kept distinct from any specific psychotherapeutic model, and 
even from the general school which often goes under the rubric of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy.6 Brandt distills from the methods only these aspects which 
are purely cognitive-those procedures that confront the agent with facts and 
logic under the appropriate circumstances. These are the procedures 
named in the definition of CP above, and they are all that Brandt will accept 
from the psychotherapeutic models. There are many non-cognitive 
elements employed in actual psychotherapeutic models that Brandt leaves 
out of the procedure. 
He goes on from the above definition to clarify: "I call it (CP| so because 
the process relies simply upon reflection on available information, without 
influence by prestige of someone, use of evaluative language, extrinsic 
reward or punishment, or the use of artificially induced feeling-states like 
relaxation. Such distillation is necessary, Brandt believes, because each of 
these other elements can be a conduit for valuational influences. He wants 
to close the door to all except rational and empirical influences on valence.8 
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Brandt's theory rests on three definitions, offered very early in his work 
then unpacked throughout. The first of these definitions is that of an 
intrinsic valence. Intuitively, intrinsic valences are distinguished from 
extrinsic ones in that the former concern things (objects, situations, etc.) 
desired or averted for their own sakes, while the latter concern things desired 
or averted as a means to some intrinsically valenced thing. So Brandt 
defines "intrinsic valence" as one "which would persist at t if the person 
involved bracketed, ignored, or put out of mind at t any thoughts or 
judgments about the probable consequences of (the valence) S, and indeed 
any thought about S not included in the concept of S."9 
Brandt is not clear about why he works only with intrinsic valences. One 
could conceive, however, that it is such valences that would give the most 
resistance to CP, so that proof that it works on them is also proof that it works 
on extrinsic valences as well. Also, that facts and logic influence extrinsic 
valences seems in need of little argument.1 0 
Second, Brandt defines a rational valence as one "that is not irrational. I 
do not meant that it would be irrational not to have {it); 1 mean merely that it 
David Zimmerman, (eds), Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ethics (Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984)—Brandt, 
pp. 104-119; Daniels, pp. 120-140. Here Brandt defends this approach on 
what Daniels calls the empiricist constraint and the disalienation constraint. 
The former states that "justification in ethics must rest on facts and logic 
alone," and the latter that "a moral code must appeal to the agent's actual 
desires or to his rational desires," Daniels, p. 125. Daniels' major criticism of 
TGR is that Brandt cannot consistently hold to these two criteria, which he 
sets for all ethical theorists in the above article. More generally, Daniels 
maintains that the two requirements are inconsistent with any attempt at 
moral empiricism. See pp. 125ff. See also the earlier form of this criticism in 
Daniels, "Cognitive Psychotherapy," pp. 777-781. 
'Richard Brandt, "Rational Desires," Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 43 (1969-70): 45. This work marks the 
formal beginning of Brandt's project, which he then developed throughout 
the decade. The definitions given here are those offered from this paper, 
even though they are modified and tightened up in TCR. This is because the 
latter definitions are more technical and contain language that would 
require additional space for explanation. For the purpose of this survey and 
critique, the definitions in "Rational Desires" are quite adequate and not 
misleading. For the full discussion, see TGR, pp. 24-32. 
1 0Stuart E. Rosenbaum points out that Brandt must make his program work 
for intrinsic valences, since extrinsic valences (or "instrumental desires," as 
he calls them) "are simply beliefs to the effect that pursuing a certain thing 
will enable one to satisfy a genuine (intrinsic) desire." "A Note on the 
Impossibility of Rationalizing Desire," The Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1984): 
66. Emphasis his. 
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is not irrational to have." He then defines an irrational valence as "one which 
would not survive, in a given person, in the presence of vivid awareness of 
knowable propositions."11 That is, an irrational valence is one that would not 
survive the proper application of CP [over timel. 
It is important to note that Brandt considers rational and irrational 
valences as contradictories, and not simply as contraries. Therefore, not only 
are there such things as rational and irrational valences, but all valences-
including intrinsic ones-are either one or the other. 1 2 Surprisingly, Brandt 
gives no argument for ruling out non-rational valences.13 He only comments 
that "This result is consistent with the general view that a desire ... is rational 
if it has been influenced by facts and logic as much as possible." This strikes 
one as a substantive claim in need of further clarification.14 
With these definitions in place, Brandt is ready to offer the reforming 
definition which is the foundation for the moral system he builds in the 
second part of the book. His proposed replacement of all value-laden talk 
with empirically testable propositions takes the form of two claims. 
The first is that there is no sentence in which the word 'good' appears, at 
least in that core complex of uses which have been important for 
philosophy, which makes an identifiable point which cannot be made by 
a sentence containing 'rationally desired,' doubtless in some complex, 
clause but in which no 'value word' is present. 
"Brandt, "Rational Desires," p. 45. Emphasis his. 
1 2Brandt does back away from the explicitly dependent definition of 
"rational valence." "I shall call a person's desire... 'rational' if it would survive 
or be produced by careful cognitive psychotherapy for that person. I shall 
call a desire 'irrational' if it cannot survive compatibly with clear and 
repeated judgements about established facts. What this means is that 
rational desire .. can confront, or will be produced by awareness of the truth; 
irrational desire cannot" (TGR, p. 113). The dependence is disguised, here, 
but not erased. The text definitions are again taken from "Rational Desires," 
because it is clear from them that Brandt is basing the notion of rational 
valence on the notion of irrational valence. This point will be important in 
the coming criticisms. See TGR, p. 126, where the dependence of rational 
valence on irrational valence is once again made explicit. 
13From this point, the absolute term "valence" will be used to mean "intrinsic 
valence." 
1 4For examples of types of "mistaken" or "irrational" valences, see TGR, pp. 
115-126, where Brandt explicates four general types. See also "Rational 
Desires," pp. 47-61. 
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1 5Brandt, TGR, pp. 127,128. 
16Brandt, TGR, pp. 127,128. 
The second claim is that there are various things we want to say, on 
reflection, which can be said by talk of 'rational desire,' but which cannot 
be said by 'good' or 'intrinsically good' in ordinary use of these terms.1 5 
This latter claim is designed to show that, given the first claim, Brandt's 
replacement candidate for moral language will do all we want moral 
language to do, and even more. We will have not just a sharply definable 
and analyzable moral system, but one that brings in points for consideration 
that the old value-laden language could not. Says Brandt, "'Good' seems to 
be not flexible enough, in its standard English uses, for us to be able to raise 
the important questions we want to raise about desires."1 6 
But the first claim is clearly the central one for Brandt's project, and 
may justifiably be called his major thesis. All substantive moral discourse is 
replaceable, without perversion or loss of content or truth value, by discourse 
concerning valences optimally influenced by relevant facts and logic. I have 
labeled this position "The Substitution Thesis" (that is, the idea of "rationally 
desired" may be substituted for the idea of "good"). 
II. Criticisms of Brandt's Program 
This section offers five criticisms of Brandt's program: First, that 
Brandt's stipulated definitions of "rational valence" and "irrational valence" 
beg substantive questions on the nature of rationality; second, that those 
stipulations also present a weak, proceduralistic notion of rationality; third, 
that the substitution thesis is suspicious in nature and inadequate in scope; 
fourth, that Brandt's distillation of cognitive elements from 
psychotherapeutic methods is illegitimate; and finally, that Brandt fails to 
account for the phenomenon of overdetermination in valence alteration. 
A. Rationality and Irrationality as Contradictory Notions 
Brandt's definitions make rationality and irrationality contradictory 
categories-at least as they apply to valences—rather than simply exclusive 
or contrary categories. This is by no means a closed question in philosophy. 
Yet Brandt's thesis depends on its being so, and it is declared so only by 
stipulative definition. 
This position could have serious consequences for Brandt's thesis. If 
rationality and irrationality are not contradictory, even when applied to 
valences, then there is the possibility of valences that are simply non-
rational. In fact, one could propose, using the CP criterion, that irrational 
valences are those that would alter under CP, rational valences are those 
that could be created or strengthened under CP, and non-rational valences 
are those on which CP would have no effect. This trifurcation may even be 
intuitively more appealing than Brandt's bifurcation. 
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But an even more serious implication of the idea that rationality and 
irrationality are not contradictory arises when it is remembered that it is 
actually Brandt's definition of irrational valences that contains all the 
substance, while rational desires are merely those that are not irrational. 
But, given a third possibility, there arises the idea that there may be no such 
thing as rational desires at all. There may only be desires that are irrational 
to have and those that are not. There is no entailment, given the three 
possibilities, between a valence being not irrational and its being rational. 
These difficulties show that Brandt's definitions do too much of the work 
in his theory, especially since no argument is given to show that the idea of 
rational desires-as simply those that are not substantively irrational-has 
any intuitive force at all. At the most crucial turning point in his program, 
Brandt relies on unargued, stipulated definitions and assumes that the point 
has been made to the satisfaction of any moral theorist. The argument for 
these definitions, which we noted above to be sorely lacking, now seems 
demanded to support the very large program Brandt suggests in the later 
chapters of the book. 1 7 
B. A Proceduralist Notion of Rationality 
The stipulated definitions beg another substantive question concerning 
the nature of rationality, namely that rationality has to do with the specific 
process of a subject's deliberation and not with its correspondence to some 
substantive objective criterion. Of course the confrontation with facts and 
logic in CP is a confrontation with objectivity, but what makes desires 
rational or irrational is simply how the subject does or would respond to these 
stimuli, and not any kind of comparison with how she should respond, or how 
others do in fact respond to similar confrontations in similar situations. 1 8 
1 7Noah Lemos points out another problem for Brandt's definitions, namely 
that they label desires and actions we naturally consider rational as 
irrational, and others we naturally think irrational as rational. "Brandt on 
Rationality, Value, and Morality," Philosophical Studies 45 (1985): 45ff. 
1 8Kurt Baier has identified four elements in a conception of rationality: "a 
capacity, an ability, an appropriate standard of excellence in that ability, and 
a tendency." Concerning the third element, Baier states, 
Rationality in this third, evaluative sense is the person's measuring up to 
some standards of acceptability in the way he complied with the reasons 
for the solution of the problem at hand. Ordinarily, the standard 
implied by 'rationality' is the minimal standard of acceptability, a kind of 
'pass' in some activity of reason, 'irrationality' the corresponding 'fail.'" 
"Rationality, Reason, and the Good," in Copp and Zimmerman, pp. 193-
211. Quotation from pp. 196, 197. It is this third sense that is missing in 
Brandt's account. Response that this clement is a normative one forces a 
BRANDT'S SEARCH 165 
Does the altering power of similar facts and logic on similar valences in 
other people have anything to say about the rationality of the response of a 
given valence in a given subject? If not, why not? Brandt does not even 
consider this possibility, and its omission is a critical oversight. 
Brandt forgoes such possible accounts of rational desires that are more 
content-based, and insists that it is simply the psychology of a given 
individual as he comes or would come into contact with a given set of 
relevant facts and logic that rules a given valence either rational or 
irrational. Thus, Brandt-rationality19 does not take into account whether or 
not the reaction of the valence to the facts and logic is what it should be (in a 
non-valuative sense), given the nature of the facts and logic. It has only a 
methodological objectivity-not substantive objectivity, as rationality seems 
to have when applied to beliefs. Brandt-rationality is solely dependent on 
the subject. It is a highly relative and unstable notion, and one that bears 
little resemblance to its doxastic analogue.20 
To illustrate the force of this criticism, consider the autistic child or fully 
psychotic adult. Empirical studies in psychology demonstrate that cognitive 
psychotherapeutic methods have no effect on such drastically withdrawn 
individuals. Therefore, were such a person a candidate for cognitive 
psychotherapy, all her valences would come out Brandt-rational. Yet surely 
one is wont to suggest that such people demonstrate paradigm cases of 
irrational beliefs and behaviors. 
Of course Brandt can rightfully object that his program is not designed 
to account for such psychological phenomena. He is concerned with the 
criticism of desires in those people considered normally functional. Yet one 
could make the case that the autistic or psychotic is different from such 
normally functional people-at least in terms of valences—in degree only, 
and not in kind. It is a defensible position that each of us, or at least many of 
us, has some desire that resembles those of the psychotic. That is, there are 
many normally functioning people who have some desires that are of the 
type that, were they of sufficient number and linked together in appropriate 
further question—is there any account of rationality that contains nothing 
like this ostensibly value-laden element, and yet retains the substantive 
objective accountability or intersubjective agreement that seems intrinsic to 
the concept? 
1 9 l am indebted to Robert Audi for this very useful term. 
2 0This criticism seems to be at the heart of Judith Wagner Decew's criticism 
of Brandt's "fully rational person." Says Decew, "|H|is own description of the 
limitations of cognitive psychotherapy and the necessity of utilizing cost 
efficiency arguments, show that his conditions of fully rational choice are not 
ones that we do accept or could be persuaded to accept." "Brandt's New 
Defense of Rule Utilitarianism: Ideal Rules and the Motivation to be 
Moral," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 113. This quotation sums up a 
discussion that runs from pp. 111-113. 
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ways, would be sufficient to label the person psychotic. Anyone who has 
wrestled with a deeply ingrained habit or obsession docs not need to be told 
how little effect cognitive elements have on the alteration of that valence. 
Such valences, reminiscent of the autistic child and psychotic adult, are 
Brandt-rational in our normally functioning adult. 
Brandt is fully aware that such valences exist in many people, and yet he 
seems not the least bit disturbed by it. "One implication of our definitions 
may be surprising. It arises from the fact that some valences, or dispositions 
to enjoy something, may resist extinction by inhibition and anything else, 
since they have been so firmly learned at an early age. By my definition 
these qualify as rational."21 
So the desire of a person who eats compulsively, even though fully aware 
of the dangers to himself, is Brandt-rational. The alcoholic who cannot 
control his drinking even when his family leaves him, he loses his job, and 
none of his friends will have anything to do with him is Brandt-rational. Any 
attempt to suggest that these people are not really fully appreciative of the 
facts involved is non-empirical speculation at best and question-begging at 
worst. 2 2 Brandt considers such results no real problem for his program, but 
this is a serious mistake. These seem to be paradigm cases of irrational 
behavior, and even perhaps of immoral behavior. 
C. Failure of the Substitution Thesis 
My final criticism of Brandt's specific program for discerning rational 
valences concerns the substitution thesis itself-the idea that all substantive 
moral discourse is replaceable. In summary, this thesis claims that 
philosophically interesting talk of "the good" (and hence, for a teleologist, all 
substantive moral talk) can be reformed or reduced into value-free talk of 
rational valences, without loss of any "identifiable point" made by the 
valuative language. This mentioning of the "identifiable point" to be made 
may arouse one's suspicions. Just what are these "identifiable points" that 
Brandt is interested in preserving; and more importantly, what kinds of 
points would he label as "unidentifiable," and therefore deem unworthy of 
preservation or analysis? 
Again, the theory threatens to beg substantive questions. One is 
suspicious that Brandt would call "identifiable" only those elements of moral 
discourse that can be effectively reduced to non-valuative, descriptive 
language. But such a move makes the desirability substitution thesis 
2 lBrandt, TGR, p. 113. 
2 2 A similar criticism is developed in Lemos, pp. 82f. "Even if some such 
intense desires and aversions would vanish under this sort of treatment I CP J, 
it is not clear that all intense cravings and aversions would vanish. So even if 
cognitive psychotherapy could remove some intense desire, it is far from 
clear why we should think that being free from such craving and aversions is 
important to the concept of rational action" (p. 82). 
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trivially true and therefore uninteresting. Brandt is probably thinking of the 
meatier claim that identifiable points are those which carry "meaning," such 
that any attempted paraphrase that did not transfer these points adequately 
would not be a proper paraphrase. But here there is much philosophical 
water to tread, and again Brandt is more interested in pontificating than 
proving. "The claim is a large one. I shall not try to support it further, but 
merely offer two examples to make clear what claim is being made." 2 3 
But at this point in the argument, more support is exactly what is 
needed. One clear point that has been defended in the noncognitivist 
tradition is that moral language does contain what Hare calls "prescriptive 
meaning." 2 4 The claim that such meaning is either reducible to talk of 
Brandt-rationality or dispensable as "unidentifiable" is a larger one than can 
be dismissed with a couple of examples. If Hare is right, then there is 
something irreducible in ethical statements. It is far from certain that he is 
wrong. Though Brandt addresses Hare specifically, he does not dispose of 
the notion of prescriptive meaning. 
D. The Distillation of Cognitive Elements from Hybrid Psychotherapeutic 
Models 
A different kind of problem for Brandt's notion of rational valences 
concerns the evidence on which he bases the claim. As explained in part 
one above, Brandt clings to the empirical findings of modern 
psychotherapeutic research, but wishes only to make use of the cognitive 
elements of effective clinical techniques. He has already been quoted as 
ruling out various non-cognitive elements in the application of CP. However, 
many of the psychotherapeutic methods that employ the cognitive 
procedures Brandt wishes to take advantage of also use these non-cognitive 
elements as essential features of the therapy. For example, the popular 
"Relaxation Response Therapy" and "Imaging Therapy" both combine 
confrontation with relevant facts and logic with a self-induced relaxation or 
hypnosis. 
These hybrid methods are effective, it is hypothesized, because the 
mind is more receptive to the introduction of information concerning 
valences when the body is relaxed. But if this is so, then it is not simply the 
cognitive elements that effect the valence alteration, but the cognitive 
elements in inextricable combination with non-cognitive elements. 
Psychological theory seems to indicate that analysis of the valence-altering 
power of the cognitive elements alone is much more complicated than 
Brandt claims—perhaps even unascertainable. Therefore, the extent to 
^Brandt, TGR, p. 127. 
2 4 R . M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: University Press, 1963). See 
especially pp. 22ff, and other passages listed in the index under "prescriptive 
meaning" and "prescriptivism." For Brandt's treatment of Hare, see TGR, 
pp. 196-199,229-233, and 243-245. 
168 AUSLEGUNG 
^Brandt, TGR, p. 113. 
2 6"Brandt would have no need to mention cognitive psychotherapy if his 
intention were merely to state that in acting rationally one should not ignore 
facts concerned with the consequences of one's undertaking, nor would he 
need to hold that the facts be repeatedly brought to mind with full belief and 
maximum vividness.'" Lemos, p. 83. 
2 7After noting that philosophers and psychologists alike will be wary of his 
project, Brandt offers two replies: 
First, 1 shall state explicitly the psychological generalizations on which 1 
rely, and where possible shall indicate the evidence for them. 1 am 
claiming that these particular generalizations are sound, however 
dubious some parts of contemporary psychology may be. Second, even 
if these generalizations turn out to require modification, at least a 
demonstration of how psychological theory can be used to establish 
normative principles will be worthwile in showing how someone can 
turn, to the same use, the theories of the future. 
TGR, p. 2. The second point especially is well taken. 
which valences can be properly labeled "rational" or "irrational" based on 
their response to such elements is itself uncertain. 
One might even ask of Brandt why he chooses to include the 
specification that cognitive psychotherapy requires the relevant information 
to be represented repeatedly, "in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate 
time."25 Are the italicized conditions cognitive? There seems to be little 
non-arbitrary account for the retention of these elements and the expulsion 
of those listed in the quotation cited in note nine above. Proper appreciation 
of factual information—in belief formation, for example—does not seem to be 
intrinsically tied to its repetition, the ideality of its presentation, or the 
appropriateness of the timing. 
Perhaps these non-cognitive elements are more innocuous than those 
he rules out—for example they do not seem to depend on preformed 
valuations like some of the others do. However, the point is that Brandt has 
not distilled all non-cognitive elements out, thereby admitting that cognitive 
elements require non-cognitive elements to be effective in valence 
alteration. He gives no argument to prove that the therapy will work without 
the ones that are removed, yet requires the ones retained. There is much 
arbitrariness on the road to defending the notion of rational valences based 
on the empirical phenomenon of cognitive psychotherapy.26 
The fact that cognitive psychotherapy appear dependent on non-
cognitive elements for valence alteration demonstrates the danger of relying 
on such pragmatic, behavior-oriented research to make judgments of 
philosophical significance. The caveat Brandt addresses early in the book 
concerning the dangers here should have been heeded. 2 7 
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E. Overdetcrmination in Valence Alteration 
There is yet another criticism that arises from the crossed purposes of 
psychology and philosophy and makes the former a suspicious origin for 
theories in the latter. This concerns the unmistakable phenomenon of 
overdetermination in valence alteration. There are many powerful weapons 
in the psychotherapist's arsenal for alteration of action and valence. Even if 
valences can be altered by CP, there remains the question why they are also 
alterable through chemotherapy, behavior modification, classical 
conditioning, psychoanalysis and a host of other approaches. Brandt implies 
that their susceptibility to CP indicates that valences can be viewed as 
intrinsically information relative, and therefore rational or irrational. But the 
behaviorist could also hold that valence susceptibility to operant 
conditioning indicates that they are simply conditioned responses, and have 
little to do with facts and logic. The chemotherapist could likewise insist that 
valences are essentially neuron reactions, and are only accidentally linked to 
conditioning or cognition. 
Daniels alludes to this problem when he notes that CP is unacceptably 
weak because it does not allow for the extinguishing of mistaken desires that 
are not susceptible to its power. He seems to have in mind the kinds of 
problems dealt with in the autism/psychosis counterexample above. "Yet 
Brandt does not strengthen cognitive psychotherapy so that the purification 
process brings more powerful techniques to bear. We cannot resort to 
psychotherapy by an expert, nor to drugs, nor to behavior modification 
techniques involving reward or punishment." Though Brandt's fears of such 
embellishments are duly noted, Daniels concludes that "An intermediary 
approach would use more powerful techniques on clearly mistaken desires. 
These points about the adequacy of cognitive psychotherapy are connected 
to deeper worries: The classical learning theory underlying Brandt's account 
may be only a fragment of an adequate learning theory."2 8 
Conclusion 
That Brandt's program offers much to be considered and used in 
further research into the possibility of a rational moral philosophy is 
indisputable. Commentators are almost unanimous in acclaiming the work 
as a most significant part of the Kantian resurgence in ethics over the last 
twenty years . 2 9 Still, the formidable problems accompanying his 
2 8 Norman Daniels, "Cognitive Psychotherapy," pp. 776-777. Daniels 
observes in a footnote that "Brandt makes little effort to connect his account 
of learning theory to recent work in cognitive psychology, especially the 
developmental literature." See for example Ethics 92, no. 3 (April 1982). 
2 9Besides many of the works cited in these notes, see also Alan Gewirth, T h e 
Future of Ethics: The Moral Powers of Reason," Nous 15 (1981): 15-31. 
Ccwirth cites Brandt's theory as the most significant example of what he 
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development show that it is far from the forceful argument he imagines, and 
a poor candidate to oversee the kinds of sweeping reforms he believes to be 
necessary to bring moral discourse into a form that can be dealt with 
effectively. 
In fact, one of the main contributions of Brandt's work may just be to 
show how extremely difficult it is to give an account of valences as rational or 
irrational. The criticisms above carry a faint echo of doubt that these terms 
are appropriate at all in reference to valences. Valences cannot be held to 
be essentially rational or irrational simply because they are, under certain 
conditions, susceptible to vivid awareness of relevant facts and logic. There 
must be an argument to show that such influence is due to the very nature of 
valences, rather than simply being accidental. 
Beliefs, for example, are considered rational or irrational because of 
their direct susceptibility to relevant facts and logic. Other avenues of belief 
alteration are considered less crucial to identifying the nature of a belief, 
because it can be argued that such influences are accidental and not due to 
the essence of a belief. For example, beliefs may be altered by 
chemotherapy, but only by disrupting the normal belief formation and 
alteration process. There is no readily available argument that CP does not 
alter valences simply by disrupting normal valence formation and alteration 
processes. 
The picture begins to emerge of an extremely c o m p l i c a t e d 
psychological phenomenon that yields little help to the philosopher in 
search of the role desires play in discerning the desirable or the good. 
Without further work, overdetermination in valence alteration leaves no 
room for the argument that any one of the overdeterminers is successful 
because it and it alone strikes at the heart of the construction and 
destruction of valences. 
What is known from psychology is that valences are reachable by 
several means, but not easily altered by any. What cannot be proved is that 
the effectiveness of these methods is due to the very nature of the valences 
or can contribute to a philosophical analysis that would allow their being 
labeled with specific philosophical descriptions (e.g. "rational").30 
calls "probabilistic procedural rationalism" in ethics. Gewirth believes that 
Brandt's program ultimately fails, as will all probabilistic procedural 
programs. He substitutes his own apodictic procedural rationalism in its 
place. 
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